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The term “green growth” and its sister concepts, “blue‐
green growth,” the “green economy,” and the “blue‐
green economy,” have gained considerable traction in
the Pacific island region in a short space of time. Pacific
island governments, regional organisations, and devel-
opment agencies all use the terms, which originate out-
side of the Pacific. What (and who) has driven the
adoption of green growth terminology within the
region? How has its usage in the region mirrored inter-
national usage? This paper presents findings from
research on the vernacularisation of green growth ter-
minology in Fiji and Vanuatu. We find a contested pol-
icy space, where Pacific actors deploy competing
meanings of green growth terms in ways that both
reflect their worldviews and support their agendas. This
diversity has helped to underpin the rapid spread of
green growth terminology in the region, while differen-
tiating it from international usage.
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2 DORNAN ET AL.1 | INTRODUCTION
In 2014, Fiji's Prime Minister, Josaia Voreqe (or “Frank”) Bainimarama, launched Fiji's first
Green Growth Framework (GGF), aimed at informing national planning across a range of
sectors. His preamble noted:The old ways of growing our economy, of developing our nation, are no longer
adequate or acceptable. We need to reshape our development strategies away from
the conventional growth model of exploiting particular resources for our own use in
the here and now. We need to refine our existing approaches and forge a new
development model ‐ one that is more holistic, integrated, inclusive and above all
sustainable … this Green Growth Framework will be one that is truly home grown,
truly Fijian. And it will benefit not only Fijians but be ready to serve as a model for
our island neighbours, who look to us for leadership on this issue as they do on
other things relating to their own development. (Ministry of Strategic Planning,
National Development and Statistics (Fiji), 2014)Bainimarama's emphasis of the “uniquely Fijian” nature of the framework was noteworthy,
as was his statement that it would serve as a model for other Pacific island countries following
Fiji's lead. His statement was also significant as the term “green growth” does not emanate from
Fiji, but rather, originates overseas, and has become widely used across the world owing to the
strong advocacy of international organisations, especially UN agencies. But his advocacy of
green growth for the Pacific was not unique. Usage of green growth terminology is now wide-
spread in the Pacific, having been adopted in national planning frameworks, used by regional
bodies, and advocated by international agencies and donors operating in the region.
This widespread usage of green growth terminology in the Pacific island region raises a num-
ber of questions. Why did the Fiji government, and later, other Pacific island governments, adopt
green growth terminology? How has the concept been transposed and vernacularised in the
Pacific context? To what extent have external actors influenced or motivated its adoption? How
has green growth terminology in the Pacific mirrored or differed from global discourses? In other
words, to what extent is the use of green growth terminology actually unique in the region?
This paper explores these questions using amixedmethodologies approach that draws on both
a review of relevant global and Pacific literature, and on case study material collected during
fieldwork in Vanuatu and Fiji. The global literature that we reviewed extends beyond academic
material to include reports and studies by international organisations. Given there is a very limited
literature focused on green growth within the Pacific, the study makes use of a great deal of grey
literature in addition to influential documents that originated from within civil society.
Our case studies draw on data provided by key informants with whom we met in Vanuatu
and Fiji. A semistructured interview approach was utilised. The interview structure, with key
questions used across all the interviews, allowed us to crosscheck data among informants.
The key informants included politicians, public servants, civil society representatives, members
of the private sector, and advisers funded by development partners. A full list of interviewees is
provided in Data S1.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background to our study, with subsec-
tions on the global green growth discourse, its adoption in the Pacific, and the academic litera-
ture on the international transfer of ideas and institutions. Section 3 details our findings from
fieldwork in Fiji and Vanuatu, which included discussion of green growth in both national
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our conclusions in Section 5.2 | BACKGROUND
2.1 | Global discourses on green growth
For such widely used terms, the history of terms such as “green growth,” “green economy,” and
“blue economy” is short. These terms were barely used prior to 2008, when the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) led the Green Economy Initiative. Increased use of green
growth terminology owes much to the efforts of UN agencies, particularly in Asia. In 2010,
UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) members adopted
the Incheon Declaration on Green Growth (UNESCAP, 2010), expressing their commitment
to the pursuit of green growth strategies. UNEP released a landmark report Towards a Green
Economy in 2011, which provided some analytical rigour to underpin the term. Non‐UN
organisations soon followed in their use and promotion of the concept. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) became a proponent when it issued the
OECD Declaration in 2009 (OECD, 2009). In 2010, the Korean Government was instrumental
in the establishment of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI): a think tank that in 2012
(at the Rio+20 Summit, discussed below) became an international treaty‐based organisation
dedicated to the promotion of green growth globally. The Green Growth Knowledge Platform,
a grouping of organisations that included UNEP, GGGI, the World Bank, and the OECD, was
also established in 2012.
The profile of green growth terminology benefitted significantly as a result of the third
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) held in 2012. Green growth
took centre stage at Rio+20, as one of two main themes for the conference. Rio+20 also saw ref-
erences to the term “blue economy.” Pacific island countries were important advocates of the
blue economy (though it originated outside of the region) at Rio+20 and were later also instru-
mental through the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) grouping in the establish-
ment of SDG14 on Oceans (Manoa, 2015). Interestingly, there was resistance among some
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) located outside of the Pacific to the use of blue economy
terminology at Rio+20. The previous year, for example, in the lead up to Rio+20, Caribbean
SIDS argued that blue economy terminology was “not required,” cautioning against “too many
colour economies” in advocacy efforts (Silver, Gray, Campbell, Fairbanks, & Gruby, 2015).1
Notwithstanding widespread usage, consensus on a precise definition of green growth termi-
nology has not been reached. As a result, green growth terminology is subject to different and
sometimes contradictory interpretations. Silver et al. (2015) in their analysis of usage of the term
“blue economy” at Rio+20 note that even within this one conference, the term was used in
many ways. At Rio+20, the “blue economy” was used to refer to (a) oceans as natural capital
(an argument that emphasised the unmeasured economic and social impacts of oceans); (b)
oceans as good business (in which the potential and unrealised financial/economic benefits of
oceans for small island states were highlighted); (c) oceans as integral to the economies of
PSIDS; and (d) oceans as fundamental to the livelihoods of households reliant on small‐scale1For the purposes of simplicity, this paper uses the phrase “green growth terminology” to encompass green growth and
all of its sister terms, including green economy, blue economy, blue‐green economy, blue growth, and blue‐green
growth.
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conflict at times. The implications of these narratives for the enclosure or market‐based
mechanisms for management of ocean resources provide a good example. Whereas green
growth arguments that emphasised economic gains (such as b and c above) were likely to advo-
cate for market‐based mechanisms for management of natural resources, alternative green
growth arguments that focused on unmeasured economic and social impacts (such as a above)
sometimes did the opposite.
Similar debates accompany usage of the term “green economy.” Critics of the term argue
that a focus on “green growth” forms part of a broader shift towards application of economic
approaches to nature and that it “moves beyond ‘selling nature to save it’” and towards “selling
nature to save the economy” (Corson, Brady, Zuber, Lord, & Kim, 2015; Suarez & Corson, 2013).
Among these critics, there is a clear distinction between “green economy” and “sustainable
development,” and a general preference for the latter—defined by the Brundtland Commission
as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland Commission, 1987). Silver et al. (2015)
differentiate the two as follows: “a core difference between green economy and sustainable
development is the former's grounding in the logic of capitalist growth rather than in recogni-
tion of its contradictions and inequalities.” In the findings that follow, it is clear that such
criticism has not been adopted in the Pacific.
Notwithstanding some global criticism of green growth terminology, debates are hampered by
the absence of clear and agreed definitions. UNEP defines a green economy as “one that results in
improved human well‐being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks
and ecological scarcities” (UNEP, 2011). This definition is not dissimilar to the Brundtland
Commission's definition of sustainable development—a similarity that is evident despite UNEP's
argument that green growth should be viewed as a tool for sustainable development.
A definition of green growth that is more distinct from sustainable development argues for
environmental protection on economic grounds. There are a number of analytical arguments
behind this definition. Green Keynesianism claims that “green” spending can boost employ-
ment in economies where factors of production lay idle. A Pigouvian perspective argues that
market failures undervalue the economy's use of natural capital and that correcting them (or
unpriced externalities) can generate environmental and economic dividends (the latter by
increasing an economy's efficiency). A third argument is Schumpeterian: Environmental
policies for green growth are said to spur innovation and create new, environmentally friendly,
industries (Jacobs, 2012).
These ideas represent an understanding of green growth that emphasises the complementar-
ities between economic and environmental objectives, an understanding that is somewhat dis-
tinct from sustainable development, which has often (not always) been used to emphasise
trade‐offs between economic, environmental, and social objectives. An understanding of green
growth that emphasises the complementarities between economic and environmental objectives
is commensurate with former UN Secretary General Ban Ki‐Moon's description of green growth
as “a new paradigm.” However, this forcefulness, backed by specific theories around how green
policies are good for the economy, is missing from most green growth definitions. The Future
We Want, the outcomes document from the most important green growth conference ever to
be held (Rio+20), provides little in the way of guidance. It simply acknowledges that green
growth is a tool for achieving sustainable development, noting that “There are different
approaches, visions, models and tools available to each country, in accordance with its national
circumstances and priorities, to achieve sustainable development” (United Nations, 2012).
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By the time green growth terminology entered the lexicon of Pacific island political life, it was
already being used by aid agencies of metropolitan powers and multilateral institutions. Global
conferences, particularly those attended by Pacific island leaders, proved important for the
dissemination of the concept in the region itself. Of particular note was Rio+20, discussed
above. In the lead up to that summit, preparatory meetings were held for island delegates to
establish shared priorities for the talks, with Pacific island countries “collectively outlin(ing) a
broad position on green economy policies” (UNESCAP, 2012a, p. 16). The work of international
organisations in the Pacific also helped socialise the term. UNESCAP, for example, published a
report on green growth in the Pacific in 2012, entitled Green Economy in a Blue World: Pacific
Perspectives (UNESCAP, 2012b).
The Pacific adoption of green growth terminology coincided with the assertion of an
increasingly independent Pacific diplomacy, particularly by Fiji.2 In 2009, after failing to hold
democratic elections, Fiji was suspended from the region's premier political entity, the Pacific
Islands Forum (PIF). Keen to maintain regional ties, and even to assert leadership, the Fiji
military led government hosted annual Engaging with the Pacific (EWTP) meetings of Pacific
leaders from 2010 to 2012, at which island representatives considered a range of environmental
issues and called for new approaches to address them. It was in this context that some island
leaders suggested green growth represented a new model of development more akin to a
“Pacific way” of doing things. At the 2010 EWTP meeting, for example, government, civil
society, and private sector representatives endorsed a call from the Pacific Conference of
Churches (PCC) for “a development model that moves Oceania towards inclusiveness and
sufficiency” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). In 2011, the EWTP meeting endorsed the
region's preparations for the 2012 Rio+20 summit and called on Pacific island states to “take
the lead in shaping the agenda of the blue/green economy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).
By this time, Fiji was also seeking to reinvigorate the PSIDS grouping at the United Nations
and was investing renewed political capital in the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG; see
Tarte, 2011, 2013). Both of these political forums also endorsed the Pacific regional approach
to the 2012 Rio+20 conference. Participants at the third EWTP meeting, held in Fiji in mid‐
2012, heard presentations on the “green economy” from UNESCAP and resolved to establish
a new regional body—the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF)—which would “bring
together leaders from key sectors in order to advance ‘green economic policies’ (Tarte, 2013,
p. 2). At the inaugural PIDF conference in 2013 the theme was ‘Leadership, Innovation and
Partnership for Green/Blue Pacific Economies.”
A number of nonstate actors helped shape emergent discussions of green growth in the Pacific
islands. Particularly important was the role of large conservation organisations, including the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the World Wildlife Fund, and Con-
servation International. These organisations explicitly sought to encourage decision‐makers to
take greater account of conservation goals in economic planning. In mid‐2011, a meeting of the
Pacific Islands Roundtable for Nature Conservation developed their own submissions for Pacific
states to take to the Rio+20 summit. The roundtable's chair, and one of the region's chief advo-
cates for green growth, IUCN regional director Taholo Kami, argued that economic policy2For an overview of the shift towards a more independent foreign policy by Pacific island states, and greater assertive-
ness in regional and global diplomacy, see Fry, Greg, and Tarte Sandra (eds.) 2015. The New Pacific Diplomacy. ANU
Press, Canberra.
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current development model is to be realised” (PACNEWS, 2011). At the same meeting, the secre-
tary general of the PCC, Fei Tevi, another green growth advocate, emphasised that there were
ecological limits to economic growth. His comments reflected a concern among church groups
more broadly that “the neo‐liberal economic ethic, which drives much of our economic thinking
and policies today, is the direct opposite of our ideal value of sufficiency” (Pacific Conference of
Churches, 2010, p. 2). By 2012, Tevi was heading a “Green Growth Leaders Coalition” (GGLC)
project at IUCN (see further below). By 2013, both Fiji and Vanuatu were considering “green
growth” strategies in national policy frameworks—discussed below.2.3 | The international transfer of ideas and institutions
Clearly, the adoption of “green growth” in policy discussions in the Pacific did not occur in a
referential vacuum. The concept was embraced at a particular moment in regional politics
and policymaking. This green growth discourse was nevertheless imported from the interna-
tional arena. Exploring how this came to be, and how global terms were translated into regional
and national contexts is, therefore, relevant for a broader literature on the transfer of ideas and
institutions between countries.
Institutionalists frequently refer to the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) when exploring
institutional transfer between countries. Their concept of isomorphism has been used to explain
similarities in modern day organisations across countries. In recent years, the term has been
developed further in order to both criticise donor‐led “one size fits all” approaches to capacity
building and to describe why modern states may outwardly look alike despite achieving
different levels of functionality. Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews (2013) argue that there is a
range of incentives for governments “to engage in isomorphic mimicry—that is, adopting the
camouflage of organizational forms that are deemed successful elsewhere to hide their actual
dysfunction.” Krause (2013) is critical of this argument, and instead makes the case for replica-
tion, arguing that mimicry is an important strategy that allows countries to develop institutional
capacity without needing to “reinvent the wheel.” He points to a number of examples of
successful replication, such as Meiji‐era Japan's successful emulation of Britain's postal service,
France's police force, and Prussia's army. Modern‐day examples including budget reform in
Chile and Mexico, both of which drew on experiences of other countries.
There is also a literature on institutional transfer in the Pacific. Larmour (2005) outlines how
institutions and the ideas that they encompass in the Pacific were generally transplanted or
imposed from outside during the colonial era. He argues that this process achieved dramatically
different results across countries as a result of how (and the extent to which) institutions
emanating from overseas were accepted and adopted as legitimate in Pacific island countries.
Crucial, according to his argument, was how new institutions interacted with pre‐existing
governance structures and the power relations underlying these.
Anthropologists have also explored the transfer of ideas and institutions. The term
“vernacularisation” is often used among ethnographers to describe the importation, adaption,
and understanding of foreign ideas in local contexts (Cheng, 2011). Particularly useful for this
study is Levitt and Merry's (2009) differentiation between three types of vernacularisation in
their research on the work of human rights organisations in India. The first type of
vernacularisation that they identify is minimalistic and involves building on the momentum
and power of foreign ideas without using them directly. Levitt and Merry use the example of
a women's rights group (called Sahiyar), which draws on human rights vocabulary to inform
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but not when working with clients whose social and cultural background makes them unfamil-
iar with such concepts. This form of vernacularisation is widely practised and, simply put, could
be described as “speaking to one's audience.” Foreign ideas may motivate the work of an outside
organisation in a particular context, but they are not referred to explicitly.
The second type of vernacularisation involves using global ideas to push new agendas that
are appropriate in a local context. Levitt and Merry's example from the work of human rights
organisations in India is their use of both international human rights vocabulary and traditional
concepts in advocacy efforts in support of the rights of homosexuals. This type of
vernacularisation goes further than the first, given its explicit use of foreign ideas and concepts.
However, these are only influential where appropriate in local contexts: in Levitt and Merry's
example, it is their combination with local ideas that makes these ideas potent.
The third type of vernacularisation involves the greatest level of modification of global ideas,
with a view to ensuring that they can be implemented in ways that are useful in a local context.
The example provided here by Levitt and Merry involves the differentiated use of “human
rights” terminology in rural and urban contexts in India, with international concepts (and
terminology) adapted in each case so as to safeguard and enhance their relevance. In this case,
global ideas are appropriated by the local context, though in ways that differentiate them from
their global usage. Thus, global ideas become localised, and in doing so, new understandings
and ideas are formed.
All of these types of vernacularisation involve the importation of foreign concepts or ideas.
What differs is their local application and the extent to which they are changed in that applica-
tion. Levitt and Merry's schema is used later to help analyse the way in which global discourses
on “green growth” have been applied in the Pacific.3 | FINDINGS
Our study of green growth in the Pacific draws on both a review of relevant global and Pacific
literature and on case studies drawing on material collected during fieldwork in Vanuatu and
Fiji. It was clear from the case studies that regional and subregional discourses have influenced
or intersected with national policymaking activities. We therefore present our findings below
under regional and national subheadings.3.1 | Pacific regional
As is the case globally, the use of green growth terminology in the regional policy space is
characterised by a multiplicity of definitions, which themselves draw on pre‐existing (including
global) discourses. These in turn are linked to competition between regional organisations, a
competition that now extends into the “green growth” space.
Terminology has formed part of that competition. The PIDF's embrace of green growth as its
raison d'être, and its “unique selling point” in a crowded regional landscape, has already been
noted (Dornan, 2014). Early adoption of green growth terminology occurred in the midst of
fraught Pacific politics about the regional diplomatic architecture. “Green growth” was advo-
cated by those challenging the political settlement at the PIF, as a more uniquely “Pacific”
vision than “regional economic integration,” which had been a key priority for the Forum for
many years.
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ing that the new organisation is an addition to the regional architecture (filling a previous gap)
and at the same time using it as one of several tools to de‐legitimise that existing architecture.
Green growth terminology has been central to such efforts. Former Fiji Foreign Minister
Kaliopate Tavola suggested that the PIDF “stands unchallenged as the sole purveyor of green
growth technical advice” to Pacific island countries (Tavola, 2015, p. 35). He was highly critical
of the PIF in the same piece, arguing that it needed reforming if it were to better represent the
interests of PSIDS without being “compromised” by “the geopolitical interests of Australia and
New Zealand” (Tavola, 2015, p. 27). However, he did not go so far as to argue that the PIDF
might replace the PIF. Indeed, he argued in the same book that the PIDF was not a direct
challenge to the PIF and that the PIDF might one day become a new Council of Regional
Organisations of the Pacific agency.
In contrast to the PIDF, the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS) has, until recently, been
reluctant to adopt green growth terminology, instead favouring terms such as “resilient develop-
ment” and “low carbon pathways” when discussing climate change and disaster management.
These terms are aligned with the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific, of which
a number of regional organisations, but not the PIDF, have carriage. More recently, the PIFS
has changed tack, in a context of continued usage of green growth terminology both in the
region and internationally. In 2017, at the 48th meeting of PIF leaders, members endorsed
The Blue Pacific: Our Sea of Islands—Our Security through Sustainable Development, Manage-
ment and Conservation (PIFS, 2017), a statement of regional identity intended to sit at the heart
of regionalism going forward. Though the PIF has been late in adopting green growth terminol-
ogy, it is clear from subsequent speeches and statements made by Dame Meg Taylor, the
Secretary‐General of the PIF, that the Blue Pacific is being used as a rallying point for Pacific
island countries, much like nuclear testing was a driver for enhancing regionalism some
decades ago. None of these statements have been directed towards the PIDF. However, neither
have they identified that organisation as (to take the words of former Fiji Foreign Minister
Kaliopate Tavola) “the sole purveyor of green growth technical advice.”
As noted earlier, the PIDF and the PIF have not been the only regional actors that have
utilised or advocated for green growth. Among the regionally focused groupings advocating for
green growth, the Green Growth Leaders Coalition has been particularly significant. As its name
suggests, the GGLC brings together leaders from across the region for discussions about develop-
ment and the environment (Pacific Leadership Program, 2017). There is a historical connection
between the GGLC and the PIDF, with the Suva‐based members of the GGLC, including Fei Tevi
(PCC), Taholo Kami (IUCN), and Iosefa Maiava (UNESCAP), being key actors during the estab-
lishment of the PIDF. The GGLC was itself created as a result of the efforts of the IUCN Pacific
office, which sought to “create a strong and effective coalition of Pacific island leaders in key
development sectors who can drive the introduction and implementation of green growth and
sustainability principles in policy and decision making in their countries” (IUCN, 2012).
At the subregional level, there was previous work done in relation to green growth by the
Melanesian Spearhead Group. In March 2012, Melanesian leaders heard a presentation from
Iosefa Maiava, head of the UNESCAP Pacific Operations Centre, on the “green economy” and
subsequently tasked the MSG Secretariat to develop a “MSG Green Growth Roadmap and
implementation framework” (MSG Secretariat, 2012). However, there does not appear to have
been any sustained momentum within the MSG for this area of work, with some noting that
the organisation has “dropped the ball” when it comes to green growth. Tensions between
leaders of countries that comprise the MSG, as well as Fiji's focus on other international fora,
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political environment in which green growth terminology has been used.3.2 | Fiji
The translation of the term green growth into a national context in Fiji occurred in the context
of multilateral efforts to protect the world's environment, including Rio+20, which was
attended by (then interim) Prime Minister Bainimarama. Subsequently, during preparatory
meetings for the 2014 UN multilateral conference for SIDS, representatives from 14 Pacific
island states endorsed “green growth” as a tool to support sustainable development and sug-
gested there was a need “to move from political commitment to tangible results” (Nadi Out-
comes Document, 2013).3 Although these multilateral discussions were ongoing, there was a
lively debate in Fiji regarding the nation's future, in the lead up to national elections in 2014
(the first since 2006 when the military took power in a coup). In June 2014, the government
launched “A Green Growth Framework for Fiji: Restoring the balance in development that is
sustainable for our future” (GGF) at a national summit in Suva. The concept of green growth
used in the GGF was explicitly derived from multilateral meetings at the UN (see Ministry of
Strategic Planning, National Development and Statistics, 2014, p. 13). However, the GGF was
at the same time presented as part of a “home‐grown” nation‐building agenda, complementing
previous national planning documents.4
Fiji's GGF clearly draws from the green growth model promoted by UN agencies in the
Pacific and shares an overarching emphasis on low carbon development and resource effi-
ciency.5 The framework sets out a very long list of proposals, covering numerous sectors. It also
refers to budgetary measures (e.g., duty exemptions and direct subsidies) intended to promote
positive environmental outcomes (Ministry of Strategic Planning, National Development and
Statistics, 2014, p. 25). In 2015, for example, Fiji introduced an environmental levy, applied to
the tourism sector, in order to raise funds for conservation efforts. The levy was increased to
10% and applied to an expanded range of prescribed goods and services in 2017 (Fiji Parliament,
2017).
There is little doubt that the adoption of green growth terminology in Fiji was also linked
with opportunities to access climate finance. “Low carbon development” is a key part of the
GGF. In part to act as an “example to the world,” Fiji has made ambitious commitments in
global fora to move to 100% renewable energy by 2030 (though the share of electricity genera-
tion from renewable energy in Fiji has been steadily declining, despite this commitment). A
significant proportion of climate finance allocated to Fiji has gone towards mitigation projects
—particularly renewable energy. GGGI has provided technical support and finance for such
investments.3In the lead up to preparatory meetings in Nadi, the Fiji government held consultations in Suva, Lautoka, and Labasa to
assess progress that was being made to implement strategies for SIDS mandated by global UN meetings, namely, the
“Barbados Plan of Action” (1994) and the “Mauritius Strategy for Further Implementation” (2004). A report arising from
those consultations suggested Fiji's post‐2015 priorities would be “built around ‘green growth’ strategies to enhance
management of resources for current and future generations” (Fiji Government, 2013, p. 38).
4Including, for example, the People's Charter for Change, Peace and Progress (2008) and the Roadmap for Democracy and
Sustainable Socio‐Economic Development (2009).
5Guiding principles from the Framework include reducing carbon footprints at all levels; improving “resource produc-
tivity (including by doing more with less)”; and providing “incentives for investment which support the efficient use
of natural resources” (Ministry of Strategic Planning, National Development and Statistics, 2014, p. 17).
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impact to date domestically is debated. Environmental policy in Fiji has been at the forefront in
some areas. In October 2017, Fiji became the first developing country to issue sovereign green
bonds—an initiative that has been oversubscribed (Reserve Bank of Fiji 2017). At the same time,
environmental groups are critical of some activities promoted by government, particularly min-
ing projects and industrial‐scale fishing.
Arguably, the greatest impact of Fiji's adoption of green growth terminology has been interna-
tional in scope, with Fiji adopting an assertive environmental diplomacy (Fry & Tarte, 2015). Dur-
ing 2017, Fiji took on significant international roles in this space, including cohosting the
inaugural UN Conference on Oceans and presidency of the UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC).6 Fiji has thus sought to reposition itself as a “large ocean state”: a coun-
try with a unique Pacific message to share about stewardship of the world's oceans and ecosystems
(Stewart, 2016). Domestic policy has supported these international objectives. It is somewhat tell-
ing that Fiji launched a new 20‐year National Development Plan in Germany at the COP23 sum-
mit, a plan that identifies “green growth” as a guiding principle for implementation and that
includes a number of recommendations from the GGF (Ministry of Economy, 2017).3.3 | Vanuatu
The leading policy document that refers to green growth terminology7 in Vanuatu is the
National Sustainable Development Plan (NSDP) (Government of Vanuatu, 2016). This plan,
which covers the period 2016 to 2030, addresses many more things than just green growth.
However, the fact that green growth terminology is used in a foundational policy document
of this type is significant, in itself.
The term “blue‐green growth” appears in two key parts of the NSDP. It is referred to under
the heading “A pristine natural environment on land and at sea serving our food, cultural, eco-






9ThereWith environmental degradation a common global challenge, Vanuatu has the
potential to be a world leader in blue‐green growth and sustainable development“Blue‐Green Economic Growth” subsequently appears as the second goal in the “Environment”
pillar,9 as follows:An economy which fosters sustainable growth and development through low impact
industries and modern technologies to ensure the well‐being of future generations.Under this sit six policy objectives, although only the first of these makes specific use of green
growth terminology (it refers to “Increase(d) access to knowledge, expertise and technology to
enact our blue‐green growth strategies.”).ceans Conference was cohosted with Sweden and held in New York. The government of Fiji worked with the
government to chair the 23rd Conference of Parties COP23 in Bonn.
re informed by those involved in leading the development of the National Sustainable Development Plan (NSDP)
ring the 3‐year process, the term “green growth” was replaced with “blue‐green growth” but the terms are largely
terchangeably.
rms part of the “National Vision” section of the NSDP.
are three pillars to the NSDP; the other two are “Society” and “Economy.”
DORNAN ET AL. 11The meaning of “blue‐green growth” in the Vanuatu context was examined with reference
to two questions: how did green growth terminology come to be included in the NSDP and
why was it incorporated into the “Environment” pillar (rather than the “Economy” pillar).
The answer to the first question appears to lie in the process by which the NSDP was created.
Further to two reviews of the previous National Development Plan (in 2010 and 2012),10 a core
group, with high level leadership, started to explore what should take its place. This led to a
National Sustainable Development Symposium held at Mele village in 2013.11 The IUCN was
asked to provide technical support for the process of developing a new national plan. It was via
this input that the concept of the three pillars (Society, Economy, and Environment) was
introduced. A former co‐chair of the core group that led the early development of the NSDP
was a member of the GGLC, which may have influenced the inclusion of green growth terminol-
ogy in the final document. However, the GGLC discourse around green growth differs quite
markedly from the technology‐focused concepts that influence the work of the Department of
Energy (DoE), which is where green growth is seen to sit bureaucratically within Vanuatu.
In relation to the second question, the technical working group that developed the content
of the “Environment” pillar within the NSDP drew on policy documents that reference green
growth terminology. These include the Climate Change Policy (Government of Vanuatu/Secre-
tariat of the Pacific Community, 2015) and the Vanuatu National Environment Policy and
Implementation Plan (Government of Vanuatu/South Pacific Regional Environmental Pro-
gramme, 2017). The “Environment” technical working group used the National Environment
Policy and Implementation Plan goals to inform the policy objectives of the “Environment” pil-
lar of the NSDP, which is why “blue‐green growth” appears in this pillar rather than under
“Economy.”
Other contributors to the NSDP process advised us that this placement of green growth ter-
minology aligns the national plan with pre‐existing environmental commitments and obliga-
tions. There is a perception that donors and regional organisations that support this sector
influenced the insertion of green growth terminology into the “Environment” pillar by the tech-
nical working group. Of particular significance is GGGI, which has very strong links with the
DoE, within the Ministry of Climate Change and Adaptation.12 Members of the DoE were part
of the “Environment” technical working group, and it appears that they sought to ensure that
the NSDP objectives were aligned with the Updated National Energy Roadmap in which the
term green growth appears. It was evident in our discussions that green growth terminology
was largely considered something that sits with the DoE, with a particular focus on increased
uptake of renewable energy products.13
A defining feature of the process of developing the NSDP was the extensive community
consultations undertaken by the Department of Strategic Policy, Planning and Aid Coordina-
tion, the government department that led the writing of the plan and that has carriage of
the monitoring and evaluation of its implementation.14 Consultations were held in urban,
peri‐urban, and rural areas in each of Vanuatu's six provinces. The information we received10Priority and Actions Agenda (Government of Vanuatu, 2006).
11Often referred to as “the Mele summit.”
12GGGI support for the DoE extends to funding in‐line positions.
13This was illustrated during the national validation summit for the NSDP. When the facilitators of the summit were
asked from the floor what the meaning of blue‐green growth was, they referred that question to the Director of the
DoE. His explanation focused on low impact development, use of new technologies, and renewable energy.
14This is a department of the Prime Minister's Office.
12 DORNAN ET AL.about the use of green growth terminology in these community discussions revealed a mixed
response, with environmental terms not easily translated into Bislama (the lingua franca for
Vanuatu). We were informed that in rural areas, where 75% of the population resides and
where cash‐based economic opportunities are limited, environmental concerns did not form
a significant part of what participants wanted to discuss. People in these areas were more
concerned about livelihood issues, such as generating a cash income to pay for school
fees, fuel, and other items they cannot provide for themselves. Environmental issues and con-
cerns were more topical in urban areas, possibly as a result of observable resource depletion
(e.g., fisheries).3.4 | Summary
The dissemination of green growth terminology in the Pacific islands has been shaped by
regional, and national, debates about appropriate development policy. In discussions that were
held primarily in Suva, the term was promoted by a coalition of regional actors, including those
working for conservation non‐governmental organisations, regional church organisations, and
even multilateral UN agencies. Amidst concern that orthodox prescriptions for development
focused too narrowly on free markets and economic growth, green growth was proposed as
an “alternative” model; one that was more in tune with a “Pacific” balancing of the economy
with social and ecological stewardship. In 2013, the Fiji government, suspended at the time
from the PIF, adopted green growth as the guiding mantra for the Fiji‐backed PIDF. Although
the PIDF did not displace the PIF as the region's pre‐eminent multilateral body, it is notable that
subsequent reform at the Forum emphasised a common Pacific identity and prioritised policy
aimed at promoting sustainable development and conservation (particularly the “Blue Pacific”
framework endorsed by Forum leaders in 2017).
At the national level, green growth assumed a different hue to that of regional discussions.
In Fiji, the government set out a GGF in the lead up to the country's first election in nearly a
decade, as it borrowed the term to articulate a “uniquely Fijian” vision for national develop-
ment. The Fiji government also sought to reposition itself on the global stage as a leader in
multilateral environmental diplomacy. In Vanuatu, green growth terminology was adopted
during protracted discussions regarding an NSDP. Some of the same actors promoting green
growth terminology in Suva were also involved in planning discussions in Port Vila, but the
term was adopted in a decidedly Vanuatu syntax. Local political leaders drew on long‐running
national debates about appropriate development, as they sought to articulate a “people's plan”
that valued economic growth as well as the country's environment and wealth of traditional
cultures.154 | DISCUSSION
Our study shows that actors in the Pacific understand and deploy green growth terminology in
different ways. Consistent with its usage by international technical agencies such as GGGI,
there are Pacific actors that use the term to focus on new technologies. This is most evident
among actors such as the DoE in Vanuatu that are involved in working towards achieving15Ralph Regenvanu, then Minister for Lands and leader of the largest political party in Vanuatu parliament, argued
green growth in a Vanuatu context referred to the sustainable development of Vanuatu's “traditional economy.”
DORNAN ET AL. 13the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions agreed to by their government under the
Paris climate accord—involving ambitious investments in renewable energy capacity.
Other Pacific actors have a different understanding of green growth. Many leaders and
policymakers valued green growth terminology primarily as a means of reinvigorating the
region's commitment to sustainable development. One regional leader noted “in the Pacific,
green growth is sustainable development. It is not about technology.” Another leader in
Vanuatu was of the view that the term added little to sustainable development and viewed its
inclusion in the NSDP as “a means of accessing international funds, including climate finance
opportunities” (though it should be noted that this leader was supportive of sustainable
development).
Related to comparisons with sustainable development was usage of green growth terminol-
ogy to advocate for alternative development models: models deemed more appropriate to the
region than those used in “the West.” Here, the emphasis was often on strengthening the
“traditional economy”—a concept especially strong in Vanuatu where support for “the Kastom
economy” has a long history. Underlying advocacy for the traditional economy was an emphasis
on indigenous cultural norms and obligations seen as important for stewardship of the environ-
ment. This emphasis on indigenous culture was especially prominent among members of the
GGLC. One GGLC member noted that usage of the green growth terminology was often contra-
dictory, with “multilaterals looking to ‘green’ energy policies to allow for continued and
increased consumption,” in contrast to “Pacific” uses of the term that were primarily focused
on “rebalancing the three pillars of sustainability: the social, the environmental, and the
economic.” A focus on social customs and obligations formed part of this narrative. Another
member emphasised that usage of “green growth” by the GGLC “is different to usage interna-
tionally. The values raised, relating to the environment, to social issues, are different.”
A related green growth narrative concerned resource sovereignty and self‐determination
(Aqorau, 2006). Policymakers pointed to resource management and to fisheries management
as areas where the Pacific could improve business models in order to “ensure that the Pacific
is not just a spectator in its own development.” The Parties to the Nauru Agreement, which
has seen fees paid by distant water fishing nations to Pacific island governments more than tri-
ple, was cited as an example of development consistent with green growth, given its economic
and environmental benefits (the latter result from limits on fishing effort that are imposed as
part of the scheme). But self‐determination was not limited to economic initiatives. Several
regional leaders also asserted that decolonisation movements in the region, especially the plight
of West Papua, should be considered within the ambit of green growth, as a social issue of
regional importance.
These narratives were present across our case studies, though there were differences
between views in Fiji and Vanuatu. What was also clear from discussions was that there was
no one understanding of green growth in the Pacific. Organisations and individuals used differ-
ent (and sometimes contradictory) understandings of green growth in ways consistent with their
worldview, often as a means to support their own agendas. So too did governments, as illus-
trated by Fiji's adoption and deployment of green growth as part of its broader foreign policy
strategy. Nonetheless, there were common themes that arose in our discussions that differenti-
ated the use of “green growth” in the Pacific from its usage internationally. The first involved an
emphasis on self‐determination and resource sovereignty: concepts that are foreign to interna-
tional discussions of green growth. The second involved an emphasis on the broader context
of cultural obligations and indigenous concepts of ecological stewardship—a theme often asso-
ciated with sustainable development (and its social objectives), but not one often drawn on to
14 DORNAN ET AL.describe green growth.16 Such understandings of green growth are directly in conflict with
global usage and criticism of the term. As noted earlier, critics have lamented what they
perceive to be as the term's market emphasis. In the Pacific, not only has no such criticism taken
place but the term has been used (such as in the case of sustainable development) as an
“alternative development model” to the neoliberal focus on economic growth.
Green growth terminology is likely to continue to be used as a part of development policy dis-
cussions in the Pacific because of the persistence of the political conditions in which the term has
been adopted. Key multilateral actors, including but not limited to the PIF, the PIDF, UNESCAP,
and GGGI will continue to influence regional and national discussions about green (and blue)
development. So too will international conservation organisations, such as IUCN, which has con-
tributed to green growth discussions and provided technical support for government planning.
Internationally, also, discussions around green growth will likely persist as powerful develop-
ment actors (both multilateral and bilateral) emphasise low carbon development in a post‐Paris
context. Although Pacific island countries are not themselves key drivers of climate change, they
have set ambitious targets to move towards low‐carbon economies. Climate‐related challenges
and responses will therefore likely shape development policymaking in the coming decades.
None of this is intended to imply that Pacific engagement with green growth will be driven
externally. As is evident from our case studies, Pacific island actors interpret or vernacularise
international messages concerning green growth in ways that are consistent with their world-
views and agendas. Indeed, underlying the widespread use of green growth terminology in
the region is this lack of a unified or clear definition. Lack of precision serves a purpose, insofar
as organisations and individuals can use green growth terms to support their own agendas, even
where these contradict each other. The fact that this is the case serves to show that the term has
not simply been adopted blindly from the international arena. Pacific islanders—and for that
matter, donors operating in the region—use the term with purpose and agency.
Linking this to the literature on the international transfer of ideas and institutions, our find-
ings are inconsistent with isomorphic mimicry, or the idea that green growth terminology is
used solely due to external pressure and is without substance. Even in the case of Pacific actors
whose definition of green growth most closely matches that of international actors—who
emphasise technological aspects of green growth (renewable energy)—the term is used with a
public good objective in mind. This does not fit well with Pritchett et al. (2013) examples of civil
servants mimicking foreign “best practice” as a means of securing their narrow self‐interest.
The identification of different green growth narratives within the Pacific, narratives that bor-
row from but differ to international conceptualisations of the term, is consistent with Larmour
(2005). His argument that foreign ideas and institutions are never transferred unchanged, but
are rather used and interpreted locally on the basis of existing understandings, institutional
arrangements, and power relations, can help explain the diversity of green growth narratives
in the region. This paper has identified this process and pointed out examples of where this
has occurred.
Particularly useful for our analysis is the literature on vernacularisation, or the transfer of
foreign concepts and ideas into local contexts. Applying Levitt and Merry's (2009) schema,
outlined in Section 2.3, we would argue that use of green growth terminology in the Pacific
has gone further than just building on the momentum of a foreign idea (in this case,16The ongoing work of the Vanuatu National Statistics Office in developing alternative indicators of well‐being provides
an example. These indicators, according to officials from the Vanuatu National Statistics Office, will capture non‐mon-
etary aspects of well‐being, including the health of traditional languages, cultures, and customs.
DORNAN ET AL. 15environmental protection). Its most common usage in the region has involved translating global
terms so that they are appropriate in a local context. Examples of this include the focus on
oceans, on natural capital, and on other issues that are pertinent in the region, while setting
aside less relevant terms such as technological change. Even in the case of renewable energy
advocates, there has been no suggestion that Pacific island economies should invent or develop
such technology, which is a common argument in regions such as Asia. In other words, green
growth terminology, even when used in ways most similar to usage in international discussions,
has not mirrored that usage exactly.
Does usage of green growth terminology in the Pacific match the third and most ambitious
type of vernacularisation identified by Levitt and Merry (2009)? Has it involved significant
modification of an international concept so as to ensure that it can be implemented in useful
ways in the Pacific? This, in our view, remains to be determined. Although the Pacific, and Fiji
in particular, has been influential in driving the international discussions concerning the blue
economy, the impact domestically remains to be seen. In some areas, there appears to have been
positive developments when viewed from an environmental protection standpoint, such as in
the establishment of marine protected areas. In others, such as the continued subsidisation of
fisheries, progress has not been so clear. The same is true in relation to green growth more
broadly. Fiji, for instance, has implemented reforms to its duties designed to encourage the pur-
chase of environmentally friendly products. At the same time, its record in relation to mining
lies in stark contrast to its international green growth advocacy. Thus, although the adoption
of green growth terminology goes beyond building momentum and has been vernacularised
so as to be appropriate in the region, the extent of its impact remains to be seen.5 | CONCLUSION
Use of green growth terminology is widespread in the Pacific. Governments across the region
have incorporated references to the green growth in National Development Plans and have
advocated for improved environmental stewardship in international fora. International and
regional non‐governmental organisations have increasingly deployed the term in their advocacy
work. Green growth terminology now also informs the work of regional organisations, with a
new regional agency having been established to promote the concept, and with the blue econ-
omy at the heart of the most recent key statement of regional identity.
This paper explored the introduction and dissemination of green growth terminology in the
Pacific, drawing on a mixed methodologies approach that involved the review of relevant global
and Pacific literature and the collection of case study material (including interviews with leaders
and policymakers) during fieldwork in Vanuatu and Fiji. It explored how, and the extent to
which, external actors have influenced or motivated the adoption of green growth terminology
in the region. It also discussed how green growth terminology in the Pacific mirrors or differs
from global discourses.
It is clear from our research that there is no one “Pacific” understanding of green (or blue)
growth. Pacific actors use green growth terminology differently, in ways that are consistent with
their worldviews and supportive of their agendas. Some Pacific actors advance a definition of
green growth that is technological in its focus, consistent with the way in which the term is
often used in Asia. Others take a very different view, using the term to advocate for an “alterna-
tive development model” that supports the “traditional economy.” We argue in this paper that
such diversity underscores the widespread use of green growth terminology in the region. It is
16 DORNAN ET AL.this lack of precision that allows organisations and individuals to use green growth terms to sup-
port their own agendas. In doing so, Pacific actors demonstrate agency in their strategic use and
references to green (and blue) growth.
The introduction and dissemination of green growth terminology in the region echoes the
introduction of other foreign ideas and institutions in the Pacific. As Larmour (2005) notes, for-
eign ideas and institutions are never transferred unchanged but are used and interpreted locally.
Drawing on ethnographic literature concerning the vernacularisation of foreign ideas and con-
cepts (especially Levitt & Merry, 2009), we argue that usage of green growth terminology in the
Pacific goes beyond using a foreign idea to build momentum and has in fact involved the trans-
lation of global terms so that they are appropriate in a local context. Though green growth has
helped strengthen an ambitious environmental advocacy in the international arena by Fiji, the
full extent of its local impact remains to be determined.ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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